We continue our look at the late nineteenth century dispute between Canada and the United States over access to the fishing grounds of Atlantic Canada. After the abrogation of the fisheries provisions of the 1871 Treaty of Washington by the United States went into effect in 1885, American access to the fishing grounds of British North America was governed by the much more restrictive provisions of the Convention of 1818. The contentious 1886 fishing season was capped by the passing of aggressive legislation by the Canadian government that promised to make the next fishing season even more confrontational.

The amended Canadian Fisheries Act spurred both Executive and Legislative branches of the United States into action. While Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard sought a diplomatic solution, Congress considered retaliatory action. In January 1887, Republican Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont introduced a retaliatory bill authorizing the President “to deny vessels, their masters and crews, of the British dominions of North America, any entrance into the waters, ports, or places of or within the United States … and also, if he think proper, to deny entry into any port of place of the United States of fresh fish or salt fish or any other product of said dominions, or other goods coming from said dominions to the United States.” That same month, Democratic Congressman Perry Belmont of New York introduced a retaliatory bill in the House of Representatives. Like Edmunds’ bill, Belmont’s bill authorized the President to close US ports to Canadian goods. Unlike Edmunds’ bill, Belmont’s bill also authorized the President to bar all Canadian products coming into the United States by land, as well as forbidding the entrance of the cars and locomotives of Canadian railway companies.

The Belmont bill was a step too far for the Republican controlled Senate, which feared the economic consequences of stopping all trade with Canada, and Congress passed Edmund’s narrower bill. President Grover Cleveland signed the retaliation bill on March 3 but had no intention to enforce it as he and his Secretary of State still sought a diplomatic solution. Similarly, Republican Senator George F. Hoar attempted to scuttle any diplomatic efforts over the fisheries dispute by introducing a resolution that forbade any reduction of the duty on Canadian fish from being a part of the negotiations. Since Canada had long sought a reduction in the duty on Canadian fish exports to the United States, this resolution would have effectively ended negotiations before they began and the Democrats were able to bottle up Hoar’s resolution in committee.

Bayard’s efforts on the diplomatic front finally bore fruit in late March when the British Government indicated that it was prepared to appoint commissioners to settle the fisheries dispute. After several months of wrangling over the composition and terms of reference of the mixed Anglo-American commission, the negotiations began on November 22, 1887. On the British side were influential British politician Joseph Chamberlain, British Minister to the United States Sir Lionel Sackville-West, and Sir Charles Tupper, Canadian Minster of Finance and High Commissioner to Great Britain. Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard led the American delegation, joined by William L. Putnam, a lawyer from New England with a deep knowledge of the fisheries dispute, and William B. Angell, President of the University of Michigan.

The commission met between November 1887 and February 1888, and it became evident early on that the American commissioners were unable to make tariff reductions a part of the discussions since they required Congressional action. The British commissioners were nonplussed and the negotiations were thrown into turmoil. Eventually, a way forward was found, and on February 15, 1888, the agreement that would become known as the Bayard-Chamberlain treaty was signed.

The treaty provided for the appointment of a commission to precisely define British North American territorial waters, instituted licenses that could be obtained by American fishing vessels which would entitle them to the same rights as other trading vessels to purchase supplies in the ports and harbors of British North America, authorized penalties for violations of the treaty, and set up the potential for the resumption of duty-free fish in Article Fifteen:

Whenever the United States shall remove the duty from fish-oil, whale-oil, seal-oil, and fish of all kinds (except fish preserved in oil), being the produce of fisheries carried on by the fishermen of Canada and Newfoundland, including Labrador, as well as from the usual and necessary casks, barrels, kegs, cans, and other usual and necessary coverings containing the products above mentioned, the like products, being the produce of fisheries carried on by the fishermen of the United States, as well as the usual and necessary coverings of the same, as above described, shall be admitted free of duty into the Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland.

And upon such removal of duties, and while the aforesaid articles are allowed to be brought into the United States by British subjects, without duty being reimposed thereon, the privilege of entering the ports, bays, and harbors of the aforesaid coasts of Canada and Newfoundland shall be accorded to United States fishing vessels by annual licenses, free of charge, for the following purposes, namely:

  1. The purchase of provisions, bait, ice, seines, lines, and all other supplies and outfits;
  2. Transshipment of catch, for transport by any means of conveyance;
  3. Shipping of crews.

The Bayard-Chamberlain treaty addressed the issues that had been straining relations between the two countries: the precise limits of inshore waters, the ability of American vessels to purchase supplies in Canadian ports, acceptable penalties for violations, and even nodded toward the Canadian desire for reciprocity (free access to British North American waters in exchange for the free entry of fish into the United States). President Cleveland sent the treaty to the Senate on February 20, 1888 with a message recommending its ratification.

Five days earlier, on the same day as the signing of the treaty, a modus vivendi was signed in case “the old conditions which have given rise to so much friction and irritation might be revived, and might interfere with the unprejudiced consideration of the Treaty by the legislative bodies concerned.” The modus vivendi took effect that same day and was valid for two years. It allowed American fishing vessels to purchase a license, at the cost of $1.50 per ton, that would allow them to purchase bait and supplies in the ports of British North America. Licenses would be issued free of charge if the United States removed the duty on Canadian fish and fish-oil. Additionally, the scope of behavior that could lead to the seizure of American fishing vessels was defined and narrowed. Thus, whatever the outcome of the ratification process, the 1888 and 1889 fishing seasons would be calmer than that of the tumultuous 1886 season.

The seat of action now shifted to the United States Senate, where the treaty would have to be ratified. Would the Republican controlled Senate, which had already shown its hostility to the Democratic president’s attempts to solve the fisheries dispute, set aside partisan rancor in an election year or would the treaty succumb to partisan politics?

Image: Thomas F. Bayard (left) and Joseph Chamberlain (right). Images courtesy of Wikimedia Commons.

Sources:

18 Cong. Rec. 929 (1887), https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CRECB-1887-pt1-v18-33-1/context.

Charles C. Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), 12-13.

John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873-1917 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage (New York: Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1932).

Charles C. Tansill, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard, 1885-1897 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1940).

Robert Craig Brown, Canada’s National Policy, 1883-1900: A Study in Canadian-American Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

U.S. Senate, The Miscellaneous Documents of the Senate of the United States for the First Session of the Fiftieth Congress, Misc. Sen. Doc. 109, Serial Set 2516 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1888). https://www.google.com/books/edition/United_States_Congressional_serial_set/ViQ2AQAAIAAJ?hl=en&gbpv=0.

Treaties and other international agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949, 13 vols., compiled under direction of Charles I. Bevins (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968-1976), 12. https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans.php.